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Experimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being
conditionally cooperative when facing a social dilemma. We formalize this mechanism in a
theoretical model that portrays a small community having joint access to a common pool
resource. The diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via interpersonal relations, while
individual agents face the temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource. Agents
remain conditionally cooperative, unless other individuals are misbehaving already. We can
observe a bubble of conditional cooperators slowly building up followed by a sudden burst,
which means that a transition from a cooperative social norm to non-cooperation occurs.
Interestingly, in some parameter regions alternative stable states and limit cycles arise. The latter
implies that the same community goes through such a transition repeatedly over long time spans
– history thus repeats itself in the form of the creation and erosion of social capital.
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1. Introduction
By now, it is well established that self-regulation of communities can be effective in reducing
overextraction of natural renewable resources, such as fish, forests, or grazing lands (Baland and
Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). Obviously, self-regulation is no panacea and there are also
examples in which community governance fails with devastating ecological and economic

40

consequences (Ballet et al., 2007; Ostrom et al., 2007). In those cases, resources are either
consistently overexploited, or the community switches suddenly from a sustainable harvesting
regime to an unsustainable one. Typically, social capital – or its erosion – is highlighted as the
pivotal element of successful community governance (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). In spite of this,
it remains difficult to disentangle different aspects of social capital in order to understand the

45

underlying mechanisms and processes (Durlauf, 2002; Sobel, 2002). Empirical studies have made
substantial progress in unraveling social capital and have identified factors that determine under
which conditions community governance thrives (Ostrom, 2009). In particular, community
cohesion (Gutierrez et al., 2011), or individuals being conditionally cooperative (Rustagi et al.,
2010) have been highlighted in that respect. Additionally, economic experiments have helped

50

understanding the behavior of individuals facing a social dilemma (Fehr and Gächter, 2000;
Janssen et al., 2010; Ostrom et al., 1994). Again, conditional cooperation has been identified as
one of the most pronounced regularities; see Gächter (2007) for an overview. The importance of
conditional cooperation has been highlighted both in a laboratory setting (Fischbacher et al.,
2001; Keser and Van Winden, 2000), and in the field (Frey and Meier, 2004). One of the main

55

challenges remains to integrate these findings into formal economic theory. By now it is well
established that economic models based on the presumption of purely rational and self-interested
agents generally perform poorly in explaining human decisions in social dilemma situations
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(Jager et al., 2000; Ostrom, 1998). Clearly, the social context is essential to understand
individuals’ tendency to conform or violate a social norm (Ostrom, 2010). Strictly speaking,
60

conditional cooperation is a form of context-dependent behavior, where the context refers to the
number of other people’s inclination to act cooperatively (Grujić et al., 2010; Traxler and Winter,
2012; Tyran and Feld, 2006). We formalize this context-dependency by developing a model to
investigate the dynamics of social norms of cooperation for renewable resource harvesting. We
take into account that individuals may be conditionally cooperative and our analysis distinguishes

65

i) how social norms of cooperation may spread in the first place, and ii) when conditional
cooperators decide to stop obeying them. Hence, we decompose conditional cooperation into a
combination of social norm compliance, and context-dependent behavior (i.e. the tendency to
violate a social norm if other individuals are also violating the norm). This distinction has been
made verbally, cf. Kahan (1997) and Keizer et al. (2008), but we are not aware of a formal model

70

that takes these two processes into account.
The notion of context-dependent behavior is in fact quite old, and many have suggested
that individuals make their choices in a decision frame or an environmental context (Granovetter,
1985; Simon, 1956). This is especially the case when time for information acquisition is scarce,
information is costly, and individuals can benefit from group knowledge by imitating others

75

(Simon, 1959). If the overall uncertainty is high, herd behavior may be observed, because agents
imitate each other’s behavior directly. These informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992)
are particularly visible in extreme situations such as riots, escape panics, or financial crashes, but
also in fashions or fads (Gladwell, 2000; Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Scheffer et al., 2003).
Context-dependent behavior differs from following a social norm, which is a customary

80

rule of behavior that is self-reinforcing (Young, 2008). When following a norm leads to a strictly
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higher payoff than not doing so, there is no need for enforcement. When this is not the case,
social norms are enforced through two mechanisms. The first mechanism can be summarized as
social sanctions. Instruments that have been explored in the literature include peer–to–peer
punishments (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008), peer–to–peer rewards (Vyrastekova
85

and van Soest, 2008), verbal expressions of disagreement and discontent (Masclet et al., 2003),
but also excluding individuals from profitable economic exchange (Milinski et al., 2002 ), and
direct ostracism (Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2007). In many cases these mechanisms are
combined, and the mere threat of using them is often sufficient to induce cooperative behavior
(Andreoni et al., 2003; Ostrom et al., 1994). The second enforcement mechanism can be best

90

described by a process of norm internalization (Young, 2008). A social norm is internalized when
an individual feels obliged to obey it, even when not monitored. In many cases, it is the
combination of sanctions and norm internalization that works hand in hand: an individual who
has internalized a norm may be willing to bear significant costs to punish norm violators
(Manski, 2000; Scott, 1971) This happens because an agent who has internalized a social norm

95

does not only feel obliged to act in a certain way herself, but she expects others to follow that
strategy as well (Bicchieri, 2006). Once a certain norm is established in a population, individuals
that do not have internalized the norm tend to conform in order to avoid punishment or
disapproval that may lead to a loss of social status (Bernheim, 1994). Thus, norm compliance
helps explaining why social norms of cooperation are followed even if non-cooperation seems the

100

more profitable choice.
Very little is known about how context-dependency and herd behavior interacts with wellestablished social norms. The strongest evidence in this respect comes probably from studies that
have looked at maritime disasters. Frey et al. (2010) compare the sinking of the Titanic and the
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Lusitania in terms of survival probability. The authors conclude that the social norm “women and
105

children first” is only followed on the Titanic, but not on the Lusitania, perhaps because the
Lusitania sunk much quicker, leading to herd behavior overruling social norms. This finding has
been challenged by Elinder and Erixson (2012) who analyzed 18 different maritime disasters and
concluded that the enforcement of social norms typically breaks down in such situations
irrespective of the duration of the catastrophe, the Titanic being an exception.

110

In our model, a common pool resource is harvested by community members that are
either cooperatively minded or selfish (referred to as defectors). Following the literature on
economic cooperation in social dilemma situations (Bischi et al., 2004; Bulte and Horan, 2010;
Sethi and Somanathan, 1996) we assume that individuals are more inclined to defect if the profits
of doing so are particularly high. Social pressure arises as a result of defectors being surrounded

115

by cooperative agents (Iwasa et al., 2007; Tavoni et al., 2012). Following Richter et al.
(forthcoming), we assume that cooperators are intrinsically motivated to obey the social norm
and try to persuade defectors to cooperate as well.
The new element in this study is that a distinction is made between intrinsic cooperators,
who have fully internalized the norm and conditional cooperators, who have not. An individual of

120

the latter group is acting cooperatively but tempted by the higher profit he considers to join the
group of defectors. We assume that the tendency to become a defector depends on the number of
agents that are already defecting (Granovetter, 1978; Macy, 1991). By incorporating conditional
cooperation, it is shown that the socioeconomic system may suddenly collapse, even if it is stable
from the outside. This happens, because unnoticed the group of conditional cooperators –

125

indistinguishable from intrinsic cooperators – slowly increases in size and a bubble of conditional
cooperators builds up. The decision to defect has a stochastic component, and if defection
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happens to increase (by chance), the bubble suddenly bursts. Then, herd behavior can be
observed, as conditional cooperators cascadingly turn into defectors. In contrast to earlier work
by Richter et al. (forthcoming), the collapse is not caused by alternative stable states but even
130

materializes if the system has only one equilibrium. In addition, the model also generates sudden
changes due to alternative stable states or limit cycles.
In Section 2 we develop the social-ecological model, derive optimal harvesting strategies
and formulate the dynamical model. The model is based on three coupled differential equations
describing the evolution of the resource stock, as well as the social norms. Section 3 analyzes the

135

model and presents results, while section 4 concludes and sketches further avenues of research.

2. The social-ecological model
We start from the model of contagious cooperation studied by Richter et al. (forthcoming), and
extend this model by incorporating conditional cooperation. We assume that there are N agents in
140

a small community who have access to a commonly-owned natural resource. The common
property regime is such that outsiders are not allowed to access the harvest grounds to extract the
resource (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Resource regeneration is described by the generic logistic
equation, which assumes a spatially fully diffused resource with a uniform density and a natural
growth function that is specified as

145

X
G=
( X ) rX 1 −  ,
 K

(1)
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where X denotes the biomass of the natural resource, r is the intrinsic growth rate and K the
carrying capacity. 1 Furthermore, we assume that the community faces a complex social dilemma
caused by two externalities. First, harvesting gives rise to an intertemporal negative externality as
excessive extraction today reduces the size of the available resource stock tomorrow. While the
150

benefits of harvesting are individual, the subsequent effect on the development of the stock is
borne by all community members. Second, resource exploitation is getting increasingly costly if
aggregate effort increases. An example for such a static externality are congested resource
grounds, forcing individuals to spend more time and fuel to find a good spot, and replacing
material that interferes and tears (Boyce, 2000; Schlager, 2002). While it is in the community’s

155

best interest to collectively take these externalities into account, each individual has the incentive
to only care about her own payoff. Our approach is similar to the one of Bischi et al. (2004), who
assume that cooperators maximize joint profits, while selfish individuals, referred to as defectors,
only maximize their individual profits.

160

2.1

Resource harvesting decisions

Each agent can either decide to engage in resource harvesting or has the outside option to work
on an alternative economic activity. Time is limited, and each individual is endowed with a fixed
effort rate ê which can be divided between these two activities. The rate at which agent i
allocates effort to resource harvesting at time t is denoted by ei (t ) , i = 1,…, N. The return to
165

effort in the alternative economic activity is constant and equal to w per unit of effort, which is

1

Throughout the paper time arguments are omitted, unless confusion may arise.
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consequently the opportunity cost of engaging in resource harvesting. The income agent i derives
from this activity per unit of time at time t is consequently w ( eˆ − ei (t ) ) , where 0 ≤ ei (t ) ≤ eˆ. The
relationship between an individual agent’s harvesting effort ei (t ) and the quantity of resource
goods harvested is given by the Schaefer production function
170

hi (t ) = qX (t ) ei (t ),

(2)

where q is the catchability coefficient. The development of the resource stock is then given by

dX
 X
= rX 1 −  − qEX ,
dt
 K

(3)

where E = ∑ i=1 ei . Regarding harvesting revenues, we assume that resource goods can be sold at
N

a constant price P so that agent i’s sales revenues are Phi (t ). We follow Clark (1980) by
175

modeling the instantaneous negative externality as a cost component in the profit function that
depends on the aggregate effort E(t) the community puts into resource harvesting. 2 We thus
assume that if an agent employs effort ei (t ) , she incurs congestion costs equal to

Z (ei ,...eN ) = vE (t )ei (t ) , where v reflects the marginal costs of congestion associated with one unit
increase in aggregate effort. 3 Individual profits π i are then given by
180

π i ( X , e1 ,..., eN=
) PqXei + w(eˆ − ei ) − vEei .

(4)

2

Alternatively, one could assume that crowding does not increase costs, but decreases productivity, which would
give similar results. Indeed, both specifications have similar consequences as they cause harvesting effort and profits
to be smaller, and effort rates chosen by cooperators to be (weakly) lower than those by defectors.
3
vei , while the cross partial derivate is given by
vE and ∂Z / ∂E =
The partial derivatives are given by ∂Z / ∂ei =

∂ 2 Z / ∂ei ∂E =v. This implies that the marginal costs of increasing own effort are higher if the resource grounds are
particularly crowded, but also that the users who are particularly active suffer more from an increase in effort by
others – the economic intuition is that in both cases it is very difficult to avoid contact with other individuals.
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Intrinsic cooperators ( CI ) and conditional cooperators ( CC ) try to manage the resource optimally
by employing their fair share of the aggregate optimal effort rate that gives the maximum
economic yield (MEY), as given by eCMEY = E MEY / N with C = CI , CC . Cooperators invest eCMEY
only when the resource is at the equilibrium level that supports the MEY. If this is not the case,
185

cooperators use an adaptive effort rule in order to approach the MEY. This implies that if
defectors overexploit, cooperators will reduce their effort rates as an attempt to rebuild the
resource stock. In order to determine eCMEY , we solve the maximization problem of cooperators,
which depends on the discount rate δ and can be given as
∞

max E ∫ ( PqXE − vE 2 + w( Neˆ − E ) ) e −δ t dt

(5)

0

190

subject to the dynamics of the resource stock (3) and taking into account each agent’s effort
endowment. Writing down the current value Hamiltonian (t ) (Kamien and Schwartz, 1981)
gives
  X

(t=
) PqXE − vE 2 + w( Neˆ − E ) + λ  rX 1 −  − qEX  ,
  K


(6)

where λ is the co-state variable. Taking the appropriate first derivatives, the first-order
195

conditions for the cooperators’ maximization problem are

PqX − w − 2vE − λ qX =
0,
PqE + λ r − 2λ r

X
− λ qE + λ =
δλ .
K

(7a)
(7b)

Using the dynamics of the resource stock (3) with (7) and setting all time derivatives equal to
zero we obtain
200

E MEY
= r (1 − X MEY / K ) / q

(8)
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and ultimately
=
X MEY

K
4rA

(

)

δ 2 A2 − 2δ r ( K 2 P 2 q 4 − KPq 2 (3B + 4rv) − 2rv( B + 2rv) + r 2 F 2 − δ A + rF (9)

with A = KPq2 + 2rv, B = qw and F = A + B.
In order to approach these optimal steady state values, a simple stock-size dependent effort
205

rule is employed of the type e= a + bX with a < 0 and b > 0, see Hilborn and Walters (1992).
The parameter a is set at a given value reflecting a precautionary reference point that determines
a minimum biomass level, below which effort is chosen to be zero. The parameter b is set such
that each cooperator invests the socially optimal effort level when the resource stock is at its
socially optimal level, i.e. the one delivering the MEY. Taking further into account that effort

210

cannot be negative, the effort rate for cooperators is given by
=
b
=
eC max ( a + bX ,0 ) with

(e

MEY

− a ) / X opt .

(10)

Defectors (D) do neither make an attempt to engage in sustainable harvesting, nor do they
consider the consequences of their actions on the payoff of fellow community members. Instead,
they take advantage of cooperative efforts by other agents and appropriate all remaining rents.
215

Therefore, they maximize the profit function (4) for individual effort taking into account the
number of cooperators, which gives the best response function (BR)

eBR
=

( PXq − w − vE−i ) / ( 2v )

(11)

with E−=i E − ei . For a single defector, the effort of all other agents can be given by

E− i = ( D − 1) eD + ( N − D ) eC , which gives, together with (11), the optimal effort of a defector as
220

eD =

( PXq − w) − veC ( N − D)
.
v( D + 1)

(12)
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Furthermore, it is assumed that at any time all agents rapidly choose the optimal effort that
corresponds with their group. We suppose that in the subsequent sections the system resides
beyond this transient state.

225

2.2

Social dynamics

In the previous sub-section we have developed a model where agents can choose between two
types of behavior when exploiting the resource: to act cooperatively, or to defect. The underlying
social dynamics are more complex, as we assume that the community consists of the three types:

N.
Intrinsic cooperators ( CI ), conditional operators ( CC ), and defectors (D) with CI + CC + D =
230

The main mechanisms of our social dynamics are developed below and can be summarized as i)
moral persuasion, ii) temptation, and iii) each agent having a social threshold for defection,
giving rise to herd behavior. Verbally, the essence of our models relies essentially on the
following assumptions that are all empirically well-founded. First, some agents are willing to
uphold a social extraction norm (doing what is optimal for the group as a whole), and try to

235

impose social pressure on non-cooperators to also start adhering to the norm (Bicchieri, 2006;
Manski, 2000; Scott, 1971). Second, the propensity to (dis)obey a cooperative norm depends on
the temptation to defect, but also on whether individuals have recently been exposed to
cooperatively minded agents (Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst, 2004; Keizer et al., 2008). Third,
agents make their propensity to defect conditional on the number of agents behaving accordingly

240

(Granovetter, 1978; Noelle-Neumann, 1974). In Fig. 1 the dynamics of the social-ecological
system are presented in a scheme showing the mechanism of each component of the system. All
agents have access to the common pool resource, and defectors harvest more than cooperators
(indicated by the thicker arrow). Moral persuasion turns defectors into intrinsic cooperators,
11
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while the temptation to pursue higher harvests triggers agents to lose their intrinsic motivation
245

and to become conditionally cooperative. But only if sufficiently many agents defect already,
conditional cooperators are prepared to do so as well, potentially resulting in herd behavior.

250

Fig. 1. The socio-economic dynamics of the system. Directed changes are driven by moral
persuasion, temptation and the inclination to defect once a social threshold is passed and herd
behavior may occur. Conditional cooperators may also change behavior randomly, which reflects
a certain degree of uncertainty in their decision-making process.

Building upon Richter et al. (forthcoming), we assume that intrinsic cooperators are intrinsically
motivated to keep up the social norm and make an effort in persuading defectors to act
255

cooperatively. Whenever an intrinsic cooperator meets a defector, there is a probability υ that the
former succeeds in convincing the latter to act cooperatively. Assuming that social encounters
occur randomly, the probability of an intrinsic cooperator meeting a defector can be modeled as a
Poisson process. The probability of an encounter taking place in a short time interval (t , t + ∆t ) is

12
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equal to λCI (t ) D(t )∆t / N , where λ is the Poisson parameter. Moral persuasion thus increases the
260

t ) − CI (t ) α CI (t ) D(t )∆t / N , where α ≡ λυ . 4
number of intrinsic cooperators by CI (t + ∆=
Obviously, intrinsic cooperators take notice of the higher profits associated with defection.
While intrinsically motivated to act cooperatively, the prospect of having higher payoffs tempts
agents to start acting selfishly, and we assume that agents are more likely to consider defection
the larger π D is compared to π C , see (4), (10) and (12). In our model, intrinsic cooperators do

265

not start defecting immediately even if temptation is sufficiently high. Instead, they lose the
intrinsic motivation to adhere to the social norm and become conditionally cooperative. More
specifically, we assume that the transfer rate due to temptation from intrinsic cooperator to
conditional operator takes the form β CI (1 − π C / π D ) .
Conditional cooperators do not make an effort in persuading defectors, and make their own

270

cooperation contingent on sufficiently many agents not defecting. The temporal dynamics of the
conditional cooperators depends on the number of cooperators that start hesitating and on the
ones of them that subsequently become defectors. Following the threshold model of cooperative
behavior (Granovetter, 1978; Young, 2009), we assume that conditional cooperators are more
inclined to defect if this is common behavior in the group. A functional form that satisfies these

275

properties can be given by the sigmoid Hill function, which is a continuously increasing function
with values close to zero for D << θ and close to unity for D >> θ with a rapid transition near

4

Note that in our model defectors do not change their behavior after an encounter with conditional cooperators, who
are – unlike intrinsic cooperators – not making an effort to morally persuade defectors.
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D = θ ; see also Janssen and Scheffer (2004) and Scheffer (2009). The social threshold function

S ( D;θ , γ ) is given by the form

S ( D;θ , γ ) =
280

Dγ
,
θ γ + Dγ

(13)

where θ is the point at which S ( D;θ , γ ) equals ½ with slope γ ; see Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. The shape for the Hill with parameter values for θ and γ as given in Table 1.

285

Since hesitation is a rather uncertain and temporary state of indecision, we will assume that there
is also a stochastic component in the decision making process. A small fraction η of the
conditional cooperators will move stochastically to one of the other groups, no matter what
happens around them. The rate at which the group of conditional cooperators changes over time
can be described by

290

 πC 
 µ Dγ

dCC
= β CI  1 −
+η  ,
 − CC  γ
γ
dt
θ + D

 πD 

(14)

where the parameter µ scales the strength of the herd behavior.
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Symbol

Description

Value

Model variables
X
Resource stock
CI
Number of intrinsic cooperators
Number of conditional cooperators
CC
D
Number of defectors
Model parameters
N
Number of agents
r
Intrinsic growth rate
K
Carrying capacity
ê
Effort endowment
Catchability coefficient
q
p
Resource sales price
v
Congestion cost
w
Opportunity cost of effort
δ
Discount rate
a
Precautionary reference point
α
Strength of moral persuasion
β
Strength of temptation
θ
Hill function parameter
γ
Hill function parameter
μ
Strength of herd behavior
η
Stochastic decision parameter

100
0.4
100
0.6
0.01
500
1
2
0.05
–0.3
0.5
0.2
N /4
5
1
0.1

Table 1. Key variables and default values of the parameters with their economic denotation
295
Having introduced all components of our system, the following equations fully describe the
dynamics of our system:

300

 π 
dCI α
1
DCI − β 1 − C  CI + η ( N − D − CI ) ,
=
dt
N
2
 πD 

(15a)

 µ Dγ
dD
1 
α
=
− CI D +  γ
+ η  ( N − D − CI ) ,
γ
dt
N
2 
θ + D

(15b)

dX
 X
= rX 1 −  − qX ( N − D)eC − qXDeD .
dt
 K

(15c)
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Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

15

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 833 [2013]

Note that the equation (14) can be omitted because CC = N − D − CI . The dynamics of the system
(15) depends on the chosen values of the parameters. In Table 1 the set of parameters are
presented with their economic denotation. Moreover, default values are given, which are used
throughout this study unless it is specified differently in the text.
305
3. Results
The presence of conditional cooperators in combination with the finite effort endowment leads to
very interesting dynamics of the system such as hysteresis and sudden changes in the time
domain. Throughout the analysis, we will distinguish two cases: the effort endowment ê is either
310

relatively high or low. If ê is high, the pressure on the resource is consequently also high. If ê is
low, the pressure on the resource is relatively low, for example because the household size is
small or the available technology is limiting the maximum exploitation rate.

3.1 Equilibria and limit cycles
315

First we analyze the case where the pressure on the resource is high; see Fig. 3. For any starting
value (CI,0 , D0 , X 0 ) the system will tend to either an equilibrium (CI* , D* , X * ) or a limit cycle. 5
Two trivial equilibria are easily traced from the equations (15). First, if no intrinsic cooperators
are present in the community, moral persuasion is absent and ultimately all community members
will be defecting, as given by CI* = 0 and D* = N . This equilibrium is globally stable for small

5

Unless specifically stated, all results are insensitive to starting values.
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320

values of the moral persuasion parameter α ; see Fig. 3a. Second, if temptation is absent ( β = 0) ,
all individuals will become intrinsic cooperators, as given by CI* = N and D* = 0. For increasing
values of β we find a continuation in the form of an internal equilibrium, see Fig. 3b. This
equilibrium state is stable except for a small interval of β where it is unstable: through a Hopf
bifurcation a small amplitude stable limit cycle arises at one end of the interval and disappears at

325

the other end. Stable periodic solutions with larger amplitudes are found for various parameter
values. Fig. 3c shows an example of a limit cycle unfolding over time.

330

Fig. 3. The equilibrium number of defectors D (solid) and the level of the resource X (dashed) for
different parameter values of the moral persuasion parameter α (a) and temptation β (b) for the
case where pressure on the resource is high and ê = 0.6. Over time, oscillatory dynamics may
occur, β = 0.15 (c).
The results are qualitatively similar for the case where pressure on the resource is relatively weak

335

( ê is low), except for some important differences; see Fig. 4. First, if the effort endowment ê is
low, exploitation is less severe, which implies a larger equilibrium resource stock. Second, full
defection occurs even if moral persuasion is relatively high; compare Fig. 3a with 4a. Full
defection also occurs if temptation is relatively weak, ceteris paribus; compare Fig. 3b with 4b. It
is perhaps surprising that higher defection occurs if ê is smaller and the pressure on the resource

340

is weaker. This finding is explained by the fact that a smaller ê implies that X is larger for a
given number of defectors, which means that profits for defectors are also larger. Therefore, the
17
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higher ê , the fewer defectors are needed to have all rents dissipated. Third, and largely
unexpected, we find that alternative stable states may coexist if ê is low. For example if
temptation increases (a shift along the horizontal axis in Fig. 4b), defection gradually increases,
345

but suddenly the system flips to a stable equilibrium of full defection. Fig. 4c shows such an
example of hysteresis with two simulations for the same set of parameters and different initial
conditions. While the upper panel portrays a situation where full defection occurs rapidly, in the
lower panel initial conditions are such that the system stabilizes with only half the agents
defecting. This shows that the steady state may be situated at either of the two branches

350

depending on the history of the system.

355

Fig. 4. The equilibrium number of defectors D (solid) and the level of the resource X (dashed) for
different parameter values of α (a) and β (b) for ê = 0.275. Panel c shows that alternative stable
may occur, depending on different initial values, α = 0.16. Initial values are
(CG ,0 , D0 , X 0 ) = (5,90, 20) in the upper panel and (CG ,0 , D0 , X 0 ) = (25,70, 20) in the lower one.

3.2 Bubbles and hidden transitions
We next consider the community facing a situation without a temptation to defect (β = 0). Then,
at t = 0, a change takes place, which brings about a strong temptation (β = 0.3); see Fig. 5a.
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360

365

Fig. 5. Sudden change from a state in which cooperation is the norm to a state in which defection
is widespread. The number of cooperatively working agents CI + CC (green solid) slowly
decreases up to the moment of collapse (a). The resource X (blue dotted) also remains at a high
level. The number of defectors D (red solid) stays low until the collapse. The sudden collapse of
cooperation (light green) can only be understood when one observes the sudden transition of
intrinsic cooperators CI (dark green) into conditional cooperators CC (yellow) (b).

In the beginning, no alarming changes can be observed, as the number of cooperatively working
agents CI + CC decreases only very slowly and the resource X remains at a high level. Suddenly,
370

a drastic collapse of cooperation occurs and defection overshoots to a level involving 95% of all
community members, before defection equilibrates at about 60% of all agents. From the outside,
the underlying process cannot be explained without understanding the role of conditional
cooperators; see Fig. 5b. Unnoticed from the outside, a steady transition of intrinsic cooperators

CI into conditional cooperators CC has occurred, resulting in a bubble of conditional cooperators
375

and ultimately in a collapse of the social-ecological system. An important element in this process
is the threshold mechanism that is incorporated in the model through the Hill function and the
stochastic component (η > 0) in the decision making process. This implies that if the number of
defectors is small, a conditional cooperator chooses with equal chance either to return to the
group of intrinsic cooperators CI or to become a defector D; see also (15). When the number of
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defectors increases, a spiral of defection materializes and agents defect cascadingly, which is
19

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

19

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 833 [2013]

typical for herd behavior. Note that this process materializes in spite of no apparent complexities,
such as alternative stable states. This phenomenon is simply caused by the adjustment transition
towards one stable equilibrium. So even if the system is outside the domain of limit cycles or
alternative stable states, surprises may occur as a result of the internal dynamics.
385
3.3 Dependence upon exogenous factors
While social complexity in the form of conditional cooperation is the main mechanism behind the
results, external driving forces may affect the resilience of the system and may induce a shift
between different qualitative states (limit cycle, single equilibrium, alternative stable states). Fig.
390

6 shows how ecological, economic or demographic changes can alter the state of the socialecological system. A change in the intrinsic growth rate, for example due to climate change, has a
profound effect on the number of defectors (Fig. 6a). For very small and intermediate intrinsic
growth rates, a limit cycle can be observed, while in-between a stable equilibrium materializes.
Surprisingly, defection rises with a higher intrinsic growth rate, and then gradually falls again.

395

This dome shaped defection pattern translates into a sigmoid shape of the resource stock (see
dashed line in Fig. 6d). While a higher intrinsic growth rate does not immediately results into a
higher resource stock (as defection increases as well), there is a point where enough rents are
created to make cooperation viable, which results in decreasing defection and increasing resource
stock, which ultimately approaches the resource stock delivering the maximum economic yield

400

( X MEY ).
Economic change, for example an increase in the return of the outside opportunity w, has a
negative effect on defection, because it makes working elsewhere more profitable and
overexploitation less tempting (Fig. 6b). Consequently, an increase in w brings the system closer
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to the X MEY , even though not substantially (Fig. 6e). Again, a transition from a stable equilibrium
405

to a limit cycle can be observed.

410

Fig. 6. Depicted are the equilibrium number of defectors D (a-c) and the level of the resource X
(d-f) for different parameter values for ecological change (r), economic change (w), demographic
change (n) for ê = 0.6.

Demographic change, such as an increase in the number of community member due to population
growth, has a strong effect on defection. For very low levels of N, all community members
cooperate (Fig. 6c), and the resource stock X is well above the X MEY (Fig. 6f). When the
415

community size increases above a certain level, the social dilemma materializes, defection
occurs, and the resource stock drops below the X MEY . Once the resource stock drops below the

X MEY , cooperators start restraining themselves, defection is still rare, and the resource stock
decreases only marginally. Once the system reaches a limit cycle, defection increases
substantially and also the resource gets depleted severely. For high levels of N, defection keeps
420

increasing, but at a rate less than the population increases (which would be given by the 45
degree line). As a result, the resource stock equilibrates at a low level of X.
21
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4. Conclusions
We have shown that the presence of conditional cooperators has profound effects on the
425

evolution and the robustness of community governance systems. Combining the effects of moral
persuasion, temptation, as well as conditional cooperation gives consistent patterns, as well as
surprising dynamics. The model corroborates earlier findings that not only the resource
dynamics, but also the evolution of cooperation depends markedly on the time available for
working that is constraining effort (Richter et al., forthcoming). Perhaps surprisingly, defection

430

can be much more pronounced if less time is available for working in the resource sector and the
aggregate pressure on the resource is only modest. This shows that social norms of cooperation
may be more difficult to establish if defectors are still able to enjoy high profits because the
resource is still in a decent shape. This sheds interesting light on the question whether a crisis
facilitates or impedes institutional change (North, 2005). In that respect, the interaction of

435

conditional cooperation and deteriorating external conditions may explain why social norms –
once established – may suddenly collapse. An important insight from our model is that
incorporating conditional cooperators may lead to surprising dynamics, even if the system is
apparently stable and features a single equilibrium. This happens because the shift from agents
being intrinsically cooperative towards being conditionally cooperative occurs largely unnoticed.

440

Thus, we may observe a collapse of the sustainable exploitation of a resource due to a massive
defection of agents previously cooperating because of herd behavior.
Furthermore, we find that the qualitative dynamics of the resource system may suddenly
change. Depending on exogenous shocks, the social-ecological system may either have a single
stable equilibrium, alternative stable states, or even a limit cycle. In particular, a change in the
22
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445

intrinsic growth rate (r) leads to surprising patterns, as it has a limit cycle at low and intermediate
values for r and a stable equilibrium in-between. Equally important is the dome-shaped
relationship between defection and the intrinsic growth rate. This result may have strong
implications for the governance of complex ecosystems, because a reduced stock productivity has
not only a direct effect on the steady state resource biomass, but also an indirect effect,

450

transmitted through higher defection. This seems especially relevant for cases where the
population is under stress by a reduced intrinsic growth rate (Hutchings, 2005), for example due
to climatic changes (Walther et al., 2002), loss of habitat (Armstrong and Falk-Petersen, 2008),
trophic interactions (Terborgh and Estes, 2010), or evolutionary change (Enberg et al., 2012).
In our model, we assume that defectors can be easily identified upon social encounter,

455

which may be more realistic for small communities, where defectors are unable to form their own
social clusters or “gangs” to avoid social pressure (Acheson, 1988). Also, we rule out the
possibility to hide harvests – an assumption that seems more plausible if the resource grounds are
either small, or resources have to be landed at a central place. If monitoring is more difficult, this
may impede the evolution of cooperative harvesting norms (Coleman and Steed, 2009; Rustagi et

460

al., 2010). If defectors can hide some of their harvests, this may also imply that cooperators fail to
perceive the correct resource stock levels and do not take the required efforts to rebuild the stock.
This seems especially relevant for resource systems where the resource stock is not directly
visible, as is the case for most fisheries (Gutierrez et al., 2011). In our model, a systemic collapse
is entirely due to the institutional setting and the underlying biological processes are rather

465

simple. We assume that the renewable resource grows logistically, which has the advantage that
any emerging social phenomena arise from a very generic non-spatial model. Allowing for a
spatial dimension favors usually cooperation, because cooperative clusters can emerge that
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defectors cannot invade (Noailly et al., 2007), while cooperation in non-spatial models requires
additional mechanisms. For a similar reason we omitted more specific resource characteristics,
470

such as an Allee effect that may occur in biological populations. It is well known that many
resource systems are inherently non-linear and may fully collapse if the resource abundance is
too low (Kramer et al., 2009). In this study we have chosen to model the dynamics of the
resource by using the relatively simple logistic growth model. In this way it has become clear that
collapse does not occur as the result of a complicated entanglement of resource dynamics and

475

behavior of the agents exploiting the resource, but solely because of social complexity.
Therefore, it remains to be investigated to what extent adding ecological complexity will affect
the evolution of social norms of cooperation.

480
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